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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Prolonged  psychological  stress  and accompanying  elevations  in blood  cortisol  are  known  to  induce
hypometabolism  and  decreasing  synaptic  density  in the  hippocampus  and  the  prefrontal  cortex  (PFC).
This article  evaluates  and  explores  evidence  supporting  the  hypothesis  that  these,  and  other,  selective
effects  of prolonged  stress  constitute  a neuroecological  program  that adaptively  modiﬁes  behavior  in
mammals  experiencing  adverse  conditions.  Three  complementary  hypotheses  are  proposed:  (1)  chronic
stress  signiﬁes  that  the prevailing  environment  is life-threatening,  indicating  that  the  animal  should
decrease  activity  in brain  areas  capable  of  inhibiting  the stress  axis; (2)  stress  signiﬁes that  the  envi-
ronment  is  unpredictable,  that  high-level  cognition  may  be  less  effective,  and that  the  animal  should
increase  its reliance  on  defensive,  procedural  and instinctual  behaviors  mediated  by lower  brain  centers;
and  (3)  stress  indicates  that  environmental  events  are  proving  difﬁcult  to  systemize  based  on  delayed
associations,  and  thus  the  maintenance  of  contextual,  task-relevant  information  in  the  PFC  need  not  be
maintained  for temporally-extended  periods.  Humans,  along  with  countless  other  species  of  vertebrates,op-down processing
have  been  shown  to  make  predictive,  adaptive  responses  to chronic  stress  in  many  systems  including
metabolic,  cardiovascular,  neuroendocrine,  and even  amygdalar  and  striatal  systems.  It  is  proposed  in
this  article  that  humans  and  other  mammals  may  also  have  an inducible,  cerebrocortical  response  to  pro-
nounced  stress  that mediates  a transition  from  time-intensive,  explicit  (controlled/attentional/top-down)
processing  of information  to quick,  implicit  (automatic/preattentive/bottom-up)  processing.
© 2016  The  Author.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license. Chronic stress, cortical plasticity and neuroecology
Organisms throughout the ﬁve kingdoms retain certain capac-
ties to adaptively modify their phenotype in order to better
onform to their environment (Auld et al., 2010). Some of these
hanges are transient and reversible, whereas some are com-
rehensive and permanent. The studies of phenotypic plasticity,
olyphenism and “predictive, adaptive responses” have shown that
irtually all species can be reprogrammed by portending environ-
ental cues, that the morphological changes are brought about
y alterations in gene expression, and that the changes allow
onformation to occasional but regularly recurring environmental
ressures (DeWitt and Scheiner, 2004). These alternate environ-
ents typically involve stressors which demand different body
ypes, behaviors, reproductive tactics, and life-history strategies
Pigliucci, 2001). Often the adaptive response to stress is conserved
ithin groups of closely related organisms that inhabit similar eco-
ogical niches (Via and Lande, 1985). For instance, even though
ll organisms respond plastically to nutrient/energy deprivation,
E-mail address: jared@jaredreser.com
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2016.06.010
376-6357/© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article un(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
mammals exhibit a unique suite of physiological changes aimed at
lowering the metabolism of speciﬁc organ systems in the interest of
continued survival (Wells, 2009). This article discusses phenotypic
changes in mammalian brain structure and neurochemistry, known
to be largely mediated by alterations in gene expression, that occur
in response to chronically high levels of the stress hormone corti-
sol. Herein, well-documented brain changes, and their behavioral
correlates, are characterized as potentially adaptive responses to
adverse ecological scenarios. Different lines of converging evidence
will be considered in an exploratory and expository manner.
The mature mammalian brain can be reshaped by chronic or
prolonged stress in two  primary ways: (1) metabolic activity, den-
dritic growth and implicit memory are enhanced in the amygdala
and caudate nucleus; and (2) metabolic activity, dendritic growth,
explicit memory and inhibitory functions are reduced in the hip-
pocampus and prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Cohen et al., 2007; Sapolsky,
2003). Many of the effects of stress on neural circuitry are medi-
ated by the stress hormone cortisol which activates the numerous
cortisol receptors present in the amygdala, hippocampus, and PFC
(Morales-Medina et al., 2009). Once activated, these receptors trig-
ger pathways that result in the expression or silencing of particular
genes, which are the molecular antecedents thought to be respon-
der the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ible for a large proportion of the neurological remodeling (Petronis
nd Gottesman, 2000; Petronis, 2004; DeWitt and Scheiner, 2004).
his remodeling, much of which has been shown to be epigenetic,
ay  help stressed mammals to adapt to environmental adversity,
ith its particular set of recurrent and ecologically relevant threats
nd opportunities.
In the literature, the responses to stress in the amygdala and
asal ganglia have been attributed adaptive signiﬁcance (Sapolsky,
003), but the responses of the hippocampus and PFC have mostly
luded the attention of evolutionary biologists (Reser, 2007).
ncreased activity in the amygdala is thought to help animals
ecome more sensitive and responsive to threat (Radley and
orrison, 2005). Neural and dendritic hypertrophy in the basolat-
ral amygdala potentiates the mechanisms dedicated to identifying
tressors, and mobilizing the body to address them (Sapolsky,
003). The amygdala stimulates the paraventricular nucleus of the
ypothalamus (PVN) to release stress hormones, and hypertro-
hy of the amygdala increases its capacity to do this (Roozendaal
t al., 2009). A different way to potentiate activity in the amyg-
ala is to release it from the structures that tonically inhibit it
Mitra and Sapolsky, 2008). The PFC and hippocampus have long
een identiﬁed in neurology as brain regions capable of inhibiting
he autonomic and emotional responses to fear-inducing stimuli
Papez, 1937; MacLean, 1949; see LeDoux, 1987, for a review). This
ircuitry ensures that mammals can override the fear response
f they make the determination that the stimulus may  appear
hreatening but is not actually threatening (Morgan et al., 1993).
iminishment of activity in the PFC and hippocampus may  ensure
hat the areas that incite stress, the amygdala and PVN, can function
nimpeded during stressful times.
Decreased activity in the PFC and hippocampus may  also adap-
ively inﬂuence the animal to be less cerebral and more impulsive
Reser, 2007). When facing lasting adversity, it may  be advanta-
eous to suppress the PFC and hippocampus because these areas
ut inhibitory pressure on defensive, instinctual, and dominant
esponses. When an animal experiences extreme stress, it is prob-
ble that its high-order behavioral strategies are proving relatively
neffectual (Boonstra, 2005). It may  beneﬁt such an animal to be
ess reliant on learned behavior, and more reliant on genetically
rogrammed and species-speciﬁc behaviors. Hence, the changes in
he hippocampus and PFC may  protectively disinhibit innate and
nstinctual urges (Reser, 2007).
The present article will elaborate on three complementary
ypotheses: (1) stress signiﬁes that the prevailing environment is
ntagonistic, and that the animal should not suppress the stress
esponse or inhibit conditioned fears; (2) stress signiﬁes that
ehaviors that the animal has learned may  be inefﬁcacious or dele-
erious and that it should increase its reliance on innate behaviors
ver learned behaviors; and (3) stress indicates that environmen-
al events are proving difﬁcult to systemize on long time scales
using delayed associations) and thus the maintenance of contex-
ual, task-relevant information in the PFC need not be maintained
or temporally-extended periods.
Several neurological changes to areas including the amygdala,
he caudate nucleus, the hippocampus, the mPFC, and the PFC in
eneral will be discussed. Table 1 describes the general psycho-
ogical consequences of these changes, the implications that they
ave for modern people as well as hypothetical implications that
hey may  have had for prehistoric foragers. This table attempts to
ighlight the disparity between the limiting repercussions of these
hanges in the modern “information age” and their potentially
daptive signiﬁcance in the prehistoric past.Interestingly, prenatal and early-life stress cause a pattern of
hanges that is strikingly similar to the changes that occur in
esponse to chronic stress in adulthood (Weinstock, 2008). When
regnant rodent or primate mothers are stressed, they programes 129 (2016) 105–115
highly analogous changes in the amygdala, hippocampus, and
PFC of their offspring (Francis et al., 1999; Kapoor et al., 2006;
Schneider et al., 1999). The behavioral changes in these offspring,
which include increased vigilance, fearfulness and stress respon-
sivity, have been interpreted by Michael Meaney and colleagues
as constituting a predictive and adaptive response to early envi-
ronmental adversity (Zhang et al., 2004). In this interpretation
the amygdalar changes are attributed adaptive qualities. How-
ever, the role of the hippocampus and the PFC in contributing to
this behavioral response has been neglected. Moreover, psychiatric
disorders such as anxiety, depression, posttraumatic stress disor-
der and schizophrenia are associated with prenatal and postnatal
stress, and involve the same pattern of changes to the hippocampus,
PFC and amygdala (Axelson et al., 1993; Corcoran et al., 2001).
Elevated levels of noradrenaline and dopamine, such as occur
during acute yet transient stress, impair PFC and hippocampus-
dependent abilities such as working memory and attention
regulation, but strengthen amygdala, caudate and subcortical-
dependent functions such as fear conditioning, habitual behaviors
and reﬂexes (Elliott and Packard, 2008; Packard and Teather,
1998). Thus, acute stress, chronic stress, prenatal stress and a
number of major psychiatric disorders have all been shown to
engineer a switch from thoughtful “top-down” control based on
task-relevance to bottom-up control based on salience (Buschman
and Miller, 2007; Hermans et al., 2014). This article focuses on these
cortical corollaries of pronounced stress, and attempts to interpret
them in terms of their ecological utility to mammals, from wild
rodents to prehistoric humans. If the neurological changes that
respond to stress were diffuse or only degenerative this might indi-
cate that they do not represent adaptation. That the alterations are
very selective, that they completely spare critical cortical and sub-
cortical regions, that there are dozens of documented molecular
pathways that converge toward these changes, and that arboriza-
tion and neural activity in the amygdala (Francis et al., 1999; Radley
and Morrison, 2005; Vyas et al., 2003) and caudate (Kim et al.,
2001; Schwabe et al., 2008) is actually enhanced, suggests that
these changes may  not be pathological. To further explore the pro-
posed evolutionary rationale for why these changes, in adulthood
and in utero, might constitute an adaptive response we turn to the
neurobiology of stress perception.
1.1. Stress perception
The recognition of an immediate physical stressor often takes
place quickly and automatically in the amygdala, whereas the
recognition of a delayed or abstract stressor takes place in the cere-
bral cortex (Bremner, 1999). The “low” and more direct pathway
(sensory receptors to thalamus to basolateral amygdala to PVN)
allows the animal to respond quickly to dangerous stimuli before
they have fully identiﬁed the stimulus or assessed the situation
(Dbiec and LeDoux, 2009). The high and more circuitous cortical
pathway is far slower (around 24 milliseconds (at its fastest) as
opposed to 12 milliseconds) because it passes through the cortex
(from the thalamus), where it is informed by higher learning cen-
ters which allow context and formal thought to tailor the response
(Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010). Quite often the cortical route serves
to subdue or inhibit the amygdala’s response to stress (Quirk et al.,
2003). The fact that the cortex has this capacity to suppress the
stress response may  make it beneﬁcial in a safe environment, but
in an adverse environment its potential to convey false security
may  amount to an unjustiﬁable liability.
The amygdala, hippocampus, cortex, and several other areas
of the brain have extensive connections to the hypothalamus, the
brain center responsible for initiating the stress response (Bremner,
1999). Even transient signals from these areas (induced by fear,
horror or helplessness) can induce the PVN of the hypothalamus
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Table  1
The neurological effects of stress, then and now.
Neurological State Psychological Consequences Implications for Moderns Implications for Foragers
Amygdala hyperactivity Potentiation of conditioned fears Anxiety, fear and excessive stress Healthy caution, preparedness
and mobilization
Caudate hyperactivity Potentiation of procedural or habitual
movements
Intrusion of habitual or procedural
responses
Increased reliance on
movements that have been
proven effective
PFC  hypoactivity Behavioral disinhibition Working memory and goal-setting
problems
Increased reliance on
instinctual and appetitive
impulses
mPFC  hypoactivity Impaired inhibition of conditioned Exaggerated stress responses to
n
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Hippocampal hypoactivity Inaccessibility of contextual and
episodic information
o secrete adrenaline and corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH),
hich act throughout the brain, especially in the hypothalamus
nd the locus coeruleus (Dedovic et al., 2009). Both adrenaline and
RH affect cognition, stimulating anxiety and fear-related behav-
ors (Gold, 2005). If the stressor lasts long enough or if the CRH
evels are sufﬁciently high, the release of adrenocorticotrophic
ormone (ACTH) is triggered within the pituitary, which induces
he release of glucocorticoids (GCs) by the adrenal cortex (Lovallo
nd Gerin, 2003). Cortisol, the GC in humans (rodents have cor-
icosterone), moderates the physiological response to chronic or
asting stressors by inducing an array of effects throughout the
ody (Mastorakos et al., 2005). Long lasting stress can alter develop-
ental trajectory and it is thought that the frequency and duration
f stress exposure carries predictive information about environ-
ental unpredictability and extrinsic morbidity/mortality. Natural
ariation (due to phenotypic plasticity or heritable variation) in
tress reactivity is thought to reﬂect niche adaptation and be asso-
iated with individual differences in a range of life history-relevant
omains including: afﬁliation, competitive risk-taking, parental
nvestment, self-regulation, somatic effort, reproductive function-
ng and learning.
A heightened stress system is thought to enhance performance
uring stress-provoking or life-threatening situations (Wingﬁeld
t al., 1998) and facilitate fearfulness, vigilance and cautiousness, all
raits that would have been highly adaptive during extended peri-
ds of dire stress (Marks and Nesse, 1994). Chronic stress is known
o initiate up-regulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
xis (HPA) in rodents, primates, and humans, causing the stress
esponse to become more pronounced, and more easily triggered
Miller and O’Callaghan, 2002; Sapolsky et al., 1986; Lovallo and
erin, 2003). This lasting up-regulation is thought to be an adapta-
ion to sustained environmental demand (Petronis and Gottesman,
000). Furthermore, enhanced amygdalar reactivity enables the
nimal to react to every seemingly threatening stimulus as if it
ere a full threat. This will inevitably lead to false alarms, but in
erms of reproductive success, it is clearly better to overreact to a
onthreat than to underreact to a true threat (Nesse and Young,
000). That the amygdala becomes hyperactive during prolonged
tress has already been attributed adaptive signiﬁcance (LeDoux,
996). How are the changes in the hippocampus and the PFC to be
nderstood though?
. The effects of stress on the hippocampus
The response to acute stress, which is mediated by adrenaline,
nd the response to prolonged stress, mediated by cortisol, increase
nergy use in the brain; heightening both memory and process-
ng speed. However, when cortisol levels are sufﬁciently high, the
pposite occurs, and energy usage in some areas of the brain can
e cut drastically (Foy et al., 2005). After about 30 min  of intense
tress this “inverted U” relationship becomes apparent and PFC andonfatal threats potential threats
xplicit/declarative memory problems Increased reliance on dominant
and procedural responses
hippocampus-dependent mental functions begin to decline rapidly
(Alexander et al., 2007; Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006; Luethi et al.,
2009; Liston et al., 2009; Sapolsky, 1994). In fact, if the cortisol levels
are elevated over many hours, neurodegenerative processes com-
mence in the forebrain, primarily in the hippocampus and PFC (Kim
and Yoon, 1998; Zhu et al., 2007). Hippocampal volume is known to
decrease in response to prolonged environmental stress in rodents,
monkeys, humans and presumably most other mammals (Lambert
and Kinsley, 2004). The damage to the hippocampus can progress
to the point of neuron loss, apoptosis, and memory impairment
in humans and also across mammalian species (McEwen, 2007).
This wide taxonomic susceptibility makes the hippocampal neu-
rodegenerative response to stress appear to have been naturally
selected and conserved.
The hippocampus, an area within the medial temporal lobe of
the brain plays the role of modulator to the hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal response to stress. It does so by inhibiting the actions of the
hypothalamus. The PVN of the hypothalamus receives extensive
inhibitory collaterals from the hippocampus (Radley and Morrison,
2005). In fact, activity in the PVN can be both tonically and pha-
sically overridden by these inhibitory inputs (Mitra et al., 2005).
The hippocampus has many cortisol receptors, is very sensitive
to ﬂuctuations in cortisol levels, and is well-suited for its job of
creating negative feedback for CRH release (Diorio et al., 2000).
When blood cortisol concentrations reach sufﬁciently high levels,
the hippocampus sends inhibitory messages through its projec-
tions to the PVN of the hypothalamus, signaling that the stress
response has gone on for too long and must be diminished (Bao
et al., 2007). However, lasting elevations of cortisol are toxic to
the hippocampus and lead to volume reduction as well as hip-
pocampal dysfunction (Kim and Yoon, 1998). Decreased volume
of the hippocampus results in diminished ability to generate neg-
ative feedback on cortisol release, and this is a driving element in
the lasting, autocatalytic potentiation of stress known as the “stress
cascade” (Sapolsky, 1996).
The high-afﬁnity mineralocorticoid receptors for glucocorti-
coids, when activated, serve to enhance learning and LTP, whereas
the low-afﬁnity glucocorticoid receptors (which are 10 times more
difﬁcult to bind to and are only occupied heavily during major
stressors) strongly inhibit both LTP and primed burst potentiation
(PBP) (de Kloet et al., 2005; Herbert et al., 2006). When the glu-
cocorticoid receptors are activated heavily, their occupancy leads
to prolonged opening of calcium-dependent potassium channels
resulting in decreased neuronal excitability (McEwen and Sapolsky,
1995). Prolonged GC elevations have been shown to lead to excito-
toxicity, cytoarchitectural damage, the inhibition of neurogenesis
and atrophy of dendritic branch points in the CA1 and CA3 cell
ﬁelds of the hippocampus (Sapolsky, 2003). Apart from the PFC,
other areas of the brain are not insulted by stress in this way.
Why  not? It is certainly possible that these changes are truly
pathological and maladaptive and that they occur due to some cur-
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ently unknown tradeoff, where hippocampal neurons retain some
dvantage despite an accompanying susceptibility to cortisol. How-
ver, given that hippocampal degeneration liberates activity in the
VN of the hypothalamus, the response may  alternatively represent
n effort to increase responsiveness to threat, a process that can be
een as complementary to the neuroproliferation in the amygdala.
Aside from its function in inhibiting the hypothalamus, the hip-
ocampus is also crucially involved in encoding and retrieving
eclarative or explicit memory which includes: episodic (contex-
ual), and spatial memories (Eichenbaum, 2004). Moreover, aside
rom reducing its ability to send negative feedback to the hypotha-
amus, chronic stress is known to impair explicit (otherwise known
s declarative or hippocampus-dependent) memory (Diorio et al.,
000; Sapolsky et al., 1986) which is central to high-level men-
al functioning. Why  should both functions share the susceptibility
o neurodegeneration? Could it be because explicit memory plays
 role in inhibiting defensive responses? Perhaps episodic mem-
ry provides information about when not to be afraid but is also
ubject to making fatal errors. Perhaps during adversity the ani-
al  should not trust hippocampal inhibitory schemas based on
solated autobiographical events but should instead act on gen-
ral, semantic knowledge (averaged over many autobiographical
vents) held in early/lower cortical areas. As it happens, the area
f the PFC that is most extensively connected with the hippocam-
us – the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) – is thought to mediate
ippocampal-dependent aspects of episodic memory, is instru-
ental in suppressing the stress response, and is also the cortical
rea damaged the most by chronic stress (Quirk et al., 2003).
.1. The effects of stress on the PFC
It is widely accepted that the mPFC has a commanding capac-
ty to diminish the stress response (Figueiredo et al., 2003). In
act, the amygdala receives extensive inhibitory collaterals from
he PFC (Radley and Morrison, 2005). Like the hippocampus, the
PFC is a target of both acute and repeated stress (Cerqueira et al.,
007). For instance, acute stress from social speaking has shown
o diminish cognitive ﬂexibility, the regulation of attention, and
orking memory (Luethi et al., 2009). Also emotionally upsetting
ovies have been associated with signiﬁcantly reduced PFC acti-
ation. Neuroimaging work has demonstrated that acute stress
egatively affects working memory-related activation of the dor-
olateral PFC (Qin et al., 2006). Chronic stress leads to dendritic
etraction and debranching in many areas throughout the PFC, in
odent, and primate models (Brown et al., 2005; Patel et al., 2008).
he volumetric reductions in rat mPFC due to stress are conﬁned
o the upper layers, where most hippocampal projections termi-
ate (Jay and Witter, 1995). Synaptic density has also been shown
o be signiﬁcantly diminished in a variety of PFC regions including
he mPFC, and dorsolateral PFC. Interestingly, data indicate that
eurons in the rat infralimbic PFC that project to the amygdala do
ot lose dendritic material in response to stress (Shansky et al.,
009), highlighting the distinct preservation of amygdala circuits.
nterestingly, as in the hippocampus, PFC dendritic damage inter-
eres with the ability of the mPFC to suppress the stress response
Mizoguchi et al., 2003).
In rodents, even short intervals of stress are capable of reversing
he extinction of fear conditioning (resulting in the resurrection of
ld fears), and this is thought to be caused primarily by stress dys-
egulation of the mPFC (Izquierdo et al., 2006). Cell ﬁelds of the
PFC attenuate emotional responsiveness by directly inhibiting
he basolateral amygdala (Figueiredo et al., 2003). Regions of the
PFC also inhibit the stress response by acting on the hypothala-
us  indirectly, through the hippocampus (Mizoguchi et al., 2003).
he PFC is connected to the hippocampus by axons originating
n the subiculum and ventral CA1 subﬁelds (the same cell ﬁeldes 129 (2016) 105–115
that shows the most pronounced dendritic atrophy during chronic
stress). These efferents travel from the hippocampus through the
ﬁmbria-fornix system and terminate in glutamatergic contacts
with pyramidal cells and interneurons of the mPFC (Liston et al.,
2006). The connections between these two areas are thought to
modulate both learning and memory processes as well as the reg-
ulation of the stress response, ultimately through inhibition of the
release of corticotrophin-releasing hormone (CRH) in the PVN of
the hypothalamus (Cerqueira et al., 2007). That these affected areas
are both involved in explicit memory, stress diminution and the
stress cascade is probably not coincidental.
Modern cognitive neuroscience has identiﬁed conﬂicts of inter-
est between the cortex and the amygdala where they often
contradict and even inhibit one another (McEwen, 2007). In fact,
the cortex tonically inhibits the amygdala, and only when a fear
stimulus is very powerful can the amygdala override the suppres-
sive effects of the cortex (LeDoux, 1996). Many studies, including
research with humans have shown that the mPFC, especially the
ventromedial PFC (vmPFC), plays a large role in inhibiting defensive
and emotional responses (Phelps et al., 2004) (Fig. 1).
To extinguish fear behaviors the vmPFC suppresses amygdala
function by engaging a network of inhibitory interneurons that
synapse on the amygdala (Sotres-Boyen et al., 2004). The vmPFC
is also the subsection of the mPFC that exhibits the greatest reduc-
tion in activity in response to chronic stress (Koenigs and Grafman,
2009). Studies have shown that rats with lesions in the vmPFC con-
tinue to act fearful in the presence of discontinued, conditioned
fear stimuli long after rats without lesions learned to ignore these
stimuli (Morgan et al., 1993, 2003; Morgan and LeDoux, 1995).
Destruction of the vmPFC abolishes the ability to suppress fears
and causes animals to react fearfully to fear conditioned stimuli,
even if they are vastly reduced in intensity (Milad and Quirk, 2002).
It seems that natural selection “acted” on this phenomenon and
selected the mPFC (and especially the vmPFC) to be susceptible to
chronic stress for functional reasons.
2.2. Why  inhibiting stress reactivity is maladaptive in an adverse
environment
In a safe environment the explicit processing of the hippocam-
pus and PFC is likely beneﬁcial because it helps the animal to draw
inferences about, systemize, and understand complex variables
in its environment. This is a time-intensive process that involves
creating and testing hypotheses. In a safe environment, faulty asso-
ciations or examples of unwarranted inhibition are not punished
heavily. Explicit processing may  take the emphasis away from
threat, and allow the animal to pursue things that it ﬁnds reward-
ing and interesting. In an unsafe environment though, an animal
should be less concerned with secondary and tertiary reinforcers,
and instead, should rely on age-old, instinctual behaviors that are
less susceptible to error.
The basolateral amygdala bases its decisions (whether to incite
stress or not) on implicit, nondeclarative, acontextual memories
(Fanselow and Gale, 2006). This suggests that the amygdala is
largely a co-occurrence detector. The amygdala warns us of sim-
ple associations without respect to how, where, when or why
(Eichenbaum, 2004). In contrast the cortical-hippocampal complex
employs explicit memories that use context and episodic events
to make inferences about the how, where, when and why (Manns
and Eichenbaum, 2006; Labar and Cabeza, 2006; Reber, 2008). This
type of inferential thinking must be susceptible to all of the pit-
falls and hazardous heuristics of cognition identiﬁed by cognitive
psychologists (Kida, 2006).
The memories for co-occurrences that exist in the PFC, rela-
tive to those in the amygdala, involve higher-order associations
because they involve neurons that are capable of sustained ﬁring
J.E. Reser / Behavioural Processes 129 (2016) 105–115 109
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Goldman-Rakic, 1995). Neurons in the PFC can span a wider
elay time or input lag between associated occurrences (Zanto
t al., 2011). Thus close temporal contiguity between two stimuli
s not necessary for them to become associated. Thus, PFC pro-
essing can involve subjective inferences about causality based
n prior experience. The response properties of neurons in the
mygdala; however, limit the amygdala to encoding information
bout the objective association of two, near simultaneous events
LeDoux, 1996). Therefore, the amygdala is susceptible to making
alse alarms and misses, but the hippocampus and cortex can for-
ulate associations (from inductive reasoning) that are illusory and
ot representative of veridical relationships in the environment.
. Stress and alterations in dopamine neurotransmission
The mesocortical dopamine system is heavily impacted by
tress. Both acute and chronic stress have been shown to dys-
egulate dopamine transmission in the ventral tegmental area
TA (Patel et al., 2008). The mesolimbic system (activated by sit-
ations requiring motivation and physical effort) in contrast, is
ot adversely affected by stress. Acute stress is associated with
ncreases in dopamine levels, excessive D1 (Vijayraghavan et al.,
007) and D2 (Gibbs and D’Esposito, 2005) dopamine recep-
or stimulation and accompanying reductions in sustained ﬁring
nd correct tuning of PFC neurons (Vijayraghavan et al., 2007).
his effect has been observed in humans (Gibbs and D’Esposito,
005) and other mammals (Druzin et al., 2000). The case is sim-
lar for chronic stress. Whereas elevated levels of glucocorticoidsmygdala, the PFC, the mPFC, and the vmPFC.
increase dopaminergic transmission in the mesocortical system in
the short-term, long-term elevations in GCs decreases dopaminer-
gic transmission causing comparable reductions in sustained ﬁring
and correct tuning of PFC neurons (Mizoguchi et al., 2000). This
has been taken to underlie the “inverted-U” relationship between
working memory and stress (Gibbs and D’Esposito, 2005) mirroring
that seen in hippocampus-dependent memory.
Dopamine sent from subcortical VTA neurons modulates the
activity and timing of neural ﬁring in the PFC acting to sustain
ongoing neural activity. Dopamine neurotransmission in the PFC
is thought to be instrumental in the ability to internally maintain,
and update contextual information. Seamans and Robbins (2010)
suggest that the DA/PFC system may  play a major role in the way
attentional resources are allocated in the effort to understand the
meaning of patterns of stimuli and the strategies to cope with or
take advantage of them. It is important for mammals to identify
and capture information about unexpected occurrences and sys-
temize them in an attempt to identify systematic patterns. It is
crucial that this effort is focused on the contextually unique fea-
tures of the novel scenario, and for this to happen those features
must be maintained in working memory through sustained ﬁr-
ing over elapsing time so that the cognitive modeling taking place
can analyze their signiﬁcance. By reducing sustained ﬁring in PFC
neurons chronic stress may  reduce the frequency of associations
made between temporally distant stimuli. During stressful times,
associations made between temporally distant stimuli may lead
to misinformed or ineffective behavior. Interestingly, neurons in
the vmPFC have been shown to be instrumental in the tendency to
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alsely perceive coherent patterns in random events (Clark, 2010).
erhaps in adverse environments it is less helpful to search memory
or relationships between stimuli that occur in delayed succes-
ion and instead to focus on those occurring in quick succession.
he dopaminergic dysregulation may  also suggest that chronic
tress takes emphasis from top-down modeling and instead places
mphasis on bottom-up responses.
. Why  inhibiting instinctual impulses is maladaptive in an
dverse environment
The hippocampus and especially the PFC, are involved in
nhibiting innate and instinctual drives, other than fears, and the
eurodegeneration that takes place in response to stress may  adap-
ively disinhibit reliable and valuable impulses (Reser, 2007; Wirth,
015). Highly encephalized vertebrates like mammals have the
bility to inhibit impulses, delay gratiﬁcation and prolong antici-
ation when it is clear that this will be beneﬁcial in the long run.
ammals and primates in particular employ this kind of restraint in
rder to wait for an opportunity, to deceive a competitor, to coop-
rate or reciprocate with a conspeciﬁc, to submit to a dominant
ndividual or to acquiesce to their own offspring (Kappeler and
an Schaik, 2006). When times are difﬁcult, resources are sparse
nd predators are numerous, restraint, deference and acquiescence
re probably ineffective tactics. In the wild, when times are tough,
emperance, discipline, hesitation and forethought may  often be
andicaps.
Neurodegeneration in the PFC and hippocampus caused by
tress are known to create deﬁcits in executive function as well as in
earning and memory (Arnsten, 2009). For instance, LTP disruption
n the hippocampus-mPFC pathway, which signiﬁcantly impairs
orking memory, can be induced after only a single episode of acute
tress in rats (Rocher et al., 2004). Chronic stress-induced den-
ritic atrophy in the mPFC has been shown to correlate with severe
unctional deﬁcits in attentional control and higher-order cognitive
unction (Liston et al., 2006). These deﬁcits in working memory
nd executive function have been speculated to be maladaptive
n the literature, because they reduce representational ﬂexibility
nd preparatory set (Cerqueira et al., 2007). This is certainly true,
ut working memory probably involves particular costs in addi-
ion to its advantages. For example, working memory allows the
eneration of alternatives to innate tendencies. Overriding innate
endencies can be adaptive or maladaptive, ultimately depending
n context.
The PFC is notorious for suppressing urges from lower, instinc-
ual regions. It sends projections to many subcortical areas,
llowing mammals to inhibit the things that come naturally (Fuster,
009). Humans constantly inhibit lower order drives. For example,
t is largely thought that anorexia nervosa is an example of the
rontal lobe suppressing the hunger drive created by lower brain
enters such as the hypothalamus (Spinella and Lyke, 2004). Hunger
s a fundamental instinctual drive that, at least in humans, can be
astly overridden by PFC function. Clearly, the cortex has the abil-
ty to formulate its own plans and use its inhibitory capacities to
reate behavior that can be at odds with reproductive success.
The hippocampus is probably also involved in inhibiting innate
ehavior, even if indirectly. The ﬁrst functional conceptualization
f the hippocampus claimed that it was an area responsible for
behavioral inhibition” (Nadel et al., 1975). Since this time, the focus
as moved to its importance in spatial abilities and episodic mem-
ry, but there is still a good deal of evidence that it is involved
n inhibiting impulses. For instance, animals with hippocampal
amage tend to be hyperactive and tend to have difﬁculty learn-
ng to inhibit responses that had previously been reinforced (Best
nd White, 1999). Thus the neurodegenerative changes that occures 129 (2016) 105–115
within the hippocampus in response to stress might also result in
behavioral disinhibition. In contrast, amygdala activation causes
an animal to neglect what it was thinking about earlier, arresting
its ongoing activity, and orienting it to a new stimulus (Morgan
et al., 1993). Animals with amygdalar lesions are less responsive
to external stimuli and exhibit a predisposition towards internal
stimulation (Kandel et al., 2000). This may  be why stress causes the
amygdala to become hyperactive, and the hippocampus and PFC to
become hypoactive, because stress signiﬁes that the focus should
be on the external world not the internal world.
The neurodegenerative effects of chronic stress may be revolting
against a hidden danger, the “tyranny” of the prefrontal cor-
tex. Hyperfrontality is a nonclinical but documented syndrome
characterized by excessive prefrontal domination of behavior.
Hyperfrontal individuals can be stoic, reserved, obsessive, repres-
sive, neurotic, detached and dispassionate. They are able to quell
and override subcortical impulses by mobilizing past learning
and beliefs. This kind of behavior can surely be adaptive but
probably only in speciﬁc ecological contexts. Hyperfrontality and
hypofrontality may  represent opposite strategies on a behavioral
continuum that have been maintained through “environmental
heterogeneity,” a form of balancing selection. The hypofrontality
seen in traumatized individuals and in those with schizophrenia
or PTSD (Buchsbaum, 1991) may  be an effort to reduce tyran-
nical prefrontal supervision, making them less “susceptible” to
temporally distant or conceptually abstract rewards. Patients with
prefrontal damage engage in behaviors aimed at immediate grati-
ﬁcation despite the fact that they can appreciate that the long-term
results of their actions are often self-defeating (Eslinger et al., 2004).
Perhaps during adversity in the ancestral past behaviors aimed
at immediate gratiﬁcation were not self-destructive as they often
prove to be today.
It is important to point out that what the PFC and hippocampus
are allowing animals to inhibit is often what their genes are “recom-
mending.” The brainstem along with the diencephalic and limbic
areas are hard-wired with a huge number of ethologically appro-
priate responses that have been engendered by natural selection
over geological time (hundreds of millions of years). Environmen-
tal stimuli are constantly activating these inclinations, and in lower
animals this almost always results in outward behavior. In ani-
mals with large cortices though, the subcortical predispositions
are merely suggestions, not commands, because of their capac-
ity to inhibit them, and to try something more complicated or
difﬁcult. Motivational impulses originate subcortically (e.g., mid-
brain reticular formation and hypothalamus), are sent via the
anterior thalamus to higher structures (e.g., amygdala, cingulate
cortex, PFC and hippocampus), which provide feedback regula-
tion that may  reinforce or inhibit the generation of the impulse.
Some of the projections carrying this feedback travel directly to the
originating structures, others regulate the ascending subcortical
inputs through the thalamus by way of the pallidum. This pro-
cess may  involve the well-known cortico-striato-pallido-thalamic
loop (Swerlow and Koob, 1987). PFC and hippocampus-dependent,
explicit memory determines what this feedback to the subcortex
will be and provides the behavior that may  supplant the subcorti-
cal recommendations. If the environment is barbaric and irrational,
then perhaps contrived and complicated behavior is less adaptive
than time-tested, instinctual behavior. This seems especially true
when one considers the fact that explicit behaviors require much
more processing time before a reaction can occur.
4.1. Chronic stress, the caudate nucleus, and reaction timeSeveral well-received studies have found that acute stress biases
processing toward caudate-dependent learning strategies (Kim
et al., 2001), and improves performance on habitual and/or well-
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ehearsed tasks (Broadbent, 1971; Wickens et al., 2007). In both
umans and rodents, chronic stress has been associated with a
ubstantial decrease in the use of hippocampal-dependent learn-
ng strategies and a dramatic increase in the use of caudate-based
earning strategies (Schwabe et al., 2008; Hartley and Adams, 1974;
ackard and Cahill, 2001). This stress-induced shift from top-down,
xplicit information processing to automatic, implicit processing
as been well characterized experimentally (Packard and Wingard,
004). Many researchers have concluded that this is due to the
act that stress impairs PFC operation but spares ingrained habits
ependent on the basal ganglia, as well as late motor and early
ensory cortices (Arnsten, 1998; Elliott and Packard, 2008). Robert
apolsky, a leading researcher of stress neuroscience, has con-
luded that the stress cascade may  adaptively recalibrate the brain
o put emphasis on regions responsible for habitual or procedural
esponses, such as the caudate nucleus (1994).
Humans under intense chronic stress have been shown to
xhibit potentiated reﬂexes and increased speed for habitual move-
ents (Pfaffman and Schlosberg, 1930; Vasterling et al., 2006;
edhara et al., 2000). Combat veterans with PTSD, especially those
ho were using the caudate heavily in life-threatening situa-
ions (such as riﬂemen), exhibit hypertrophic caudate nuclei and
trophic hippocampi (Bremner, 1999). Since the processes of the
ippocampal and caudate systems work antagonistically at times
Voermans et al., 2004), hypoactivity in the hippocampus and
FC may  permit subcortical movement areas more autonomy and
nsure that the thinking mind cannot easily interfere with their
esponses.
Reaction time or the delay between the input and output seen
n an animal’s behavior is an indication of the amount of neural
rocessing taking place, where more processing equates to longer
elays (Bogacz et al., 2009). The least encephalized animals have
he fastest responses (Chittka et al., 2009). For example, animals
uch as insects display reaction times that are hundredths of those
bserved for mammals (Dean, 2005). In fact, reaction time slows
ith the number of synapses interposed between input and output
Kandel et al., 2000). The neurodegenerative effects of stress on
he PFC likely act to adaptively potentiate instinct, but may  also
peed up reaction to the environment as it is known that explicit
ovements trade speed for informedness.
. The hippocampus and neuroecology
Behavioral strategies based on hippocampal learning probably
ork well in a predictable and ordered environment. An environ-
ent that sends clear, honest signals about the interrelationships
etween complex variables allows animals to formulate ecolog-
cally meaningful knowledge. Chaotic and violent environments;
owever, may  not be amenable to hippocampal-based strategies.
n a stressful environment many of these signals are probably mud-
led and misleading. Psychologist George Kelly has argued that in
 stressful or anxiety-provoking environment is it usually very dif-
cult for humans to understand the important variables and how
hey interrelate (1991). Stress is known to be exacerbated when the
uman or rodent cannot ﬁgure out how to make things better, feels
elpless or feels like it has no control (Glass et al., 1971; Minor et al.,
984). In fact, an experimental animal that is subjected to numer-
us stressors will liberate signiﬁcantly less cortisol if it is made to
hink that it has some control over the frequency of the stressors,
ven if it does not actually have any control at all (Sapolsky, 1994).
f the animal has no control over environmental variables then why
hould it expend energy attempting to understand and systemize
hem? Top-down regulation of behavior may  only be beneﬁcial
or reproductive success if the animal has the capacity to use its
ystemizations to exert meaningful control. When environmentales 129 (2016) 105–115 111
variables are incomprehensible and the animal has little inﬂuence
over its state of affairs, then explicit thinking may  be as extraneous
as it is in less encephalized animals; speciﬁcally because there is no
“correct solution” for higher cognition to arrive at.
The glucocorticoid stress hormones generally cause different
tissues and organ systems to put off long-term, expensive build-
ing projects like growth, most forms of anabolism, digestion, tissue
repair, sexual reproduction and immune function. They do this to
redirect the body’s energy toward ﬁghting and ﬂight. In much the
same way, PFC and hippocampal-dependent learning (unlike cau-
date and amygdalar learning) are very much slow and cumulative
processes that represent long-term efforts at informing behavior
in the distant future (Eichenbaum, 2004). If supply lines toward
provident but expensive long-term somatic efforts are cut off when
cortisol is elevated, it seems sensible that the PFC and hippocampus
would fall into this category. Hippocampal-dependent memory,
in the sense that it is contextual and episodic, represents new,
untested learning, and for this reason, relative to other brain areas,
it may  be expendable in adverse situations.
Importantly, there are other examples of natural selection
favoring altered processing priorities, and these also involve
neurodegeneration. The study of neuroecology has shown that hip-
pocampal size can vary dramatically in individual animals over the
course of a single season. In fact, neuronal ﬂuctuations in the hip-
pocampus are known to occur in a wide variety of food-caching
mammals (Kempermann, 2002) and birds (Garamszegi and Eens,
2004). The hippocampus increases signiﬁcantly in volume during
seasons where the animal must remember where it hid its food,
and then decreases when the season ends (Clayton, 2001). In fact,
neurogenesis in the hippocampi of individual adult mammals is
known to increase with environmental stimulation and enrich-
ment (Kempermann et al., 1997, 1998), and decrease along with
the diminishment of body size, metabolic rate and need to forage
(Jacobs, 1996). This relationship, between environmental demands
and investment in hippocampal neurons is commonly interpreted
to be an ecological strategy focused on the tradeoff between saving
energy, and reliance on hippocampus-dependent memory (Dukas,
2004). The similarities here suggest that the stress cascade, which
occurs in a wide variety of animals, may  also be an example of a
neuroecological response.
6. Stress, cognition and evolutionary medicine
Evolutionary medicine is the ﬁeld of study that attempts to
understand disorder and disease in terms of evolutionary biol-
ogy. It has clariﬁed the evolutionary origins of many of the most
prevalent diseases including atherosclerosis, cancer, cardiovascular
disease, cystic ﬁbrosis, diabetes mellitus, obesity, sickle cell ane-
mia  and many others (Nesse and Williams, 1995; Williams and
Nesse, 1991). Following the pioneering work of Panksepp (2006)
there has been a movement to understand psychiatric disturbances
in terms of the underlying evolutionary mechanisms that they
may  represent. Many articles have analyzed various forms of psy-
chopathology in terms of evolutionary theory and evolutionary
medicine (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1997; Marks and Nesse, 1994; Reser,
2009), and this area of research has been referred to as “evolution-
ary psychopathology,” or “Darwinian psychiatry”.
Researchers in the ﬁeld of evolutionary medicine view stress and
anxiety as adaptive when they permit animals to effectively escape
danger (Marks and Nesse, 1994). It has been shown that animals
that have a genetic susceptibility to being highly stressed or anxious
are more likely to avoid being eaten by predators (Dugatkin, 1992).
In fact, Williams and Nesse (1991) have pointed out that a procliv-
ity for enhanced stress responsiveness may  be highly beneﬁcial in
terms of reproductive success, especially in adverse environments.
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Table 2
The neurological effects of stress associated with different conditions.
Condition Hippocampus Hypoactivity PFC Hypoactivity Amygdala Hyperactivity
Acute Stress de Kloet et al. (2005), Herbert et al.
(2006), Elliott and Packard (2008)
Rocher et al. (2004), Patel et al. (2008) Radley and Morrison (2005),
Roozendaal et al. (2009)
Chronic Stress Kim and Yoon (1998), Lambert and
Kinsey (2004)
Liston et al. (2006), Zhu et al. (2007) Francis et al. (1999), Radley and
Morrison (2005), Vyas et al. (2003)
Prenatal Stress Weinstock (2008), Schneider et al.
(1999)
Francis et al. (1999), Kapoor et al.
(2006)
Zhang et al. 2004, Diorio et al. (2000)
Anxiety Disorder McEwen (2007) Francis et al. (1999), Vyas et al. (2003)
Depression Lambert and Kinsley (2004) Corcoran et al. (2001), Axelson et al.
93)
Panksepp, 2006
ldman-Rakic (1995)
I
n
h
a
2
i
(
r
c
h
i
t
r
r
a
P
t
t
c
i
(
s
t
e
d
s
t
(
t
a
r
h
d
a
l
a
p
2
a
s
a
a
a
a
r
f
h
o
Table 3
Features of the stress cascade that are interpreted in an evolutionary context.
• Wide taxonomic susceptibility with highly conserved features
•  Dozens of molecular pathways that converge toward the neurological
changes
•  A high degree of neuroanatomical speciﬁcity within and between species
•  Most brain areas are completely spared
•  Some brain areas are up-regulated rather than down-regulated
•  Neural remodeling resembles known neuroecological changes
•  Acute stress, chronic stress and prenatal stress share neuropathological
symptomatology
•  Anxiety disorder, depression, PTSD and schizophrenia also share these
symptoms(19
PTSD Bremner (1999) 
Schizophrenia Go
n fact, it is widely accepted that diverse animal species use the
euroendocrine stress axis to integrate sensory input regarding
abitat quality to inform the appropriate level of fear, withdrawal,
voidance, paranoia and other defensive behaviors (Diorio et al.,
000).
Articles written in evolutionary medicine have examined clin-
cal syndromes such as anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder
PTSD) and depression, and characterized them as beneﬁcial
esponses to dangers such as predator pressure, scarcity and
onspeciﬁc conﬂict (Baron-Cohen, 1997). Each of these disorders
as been hypothesized to respond to different ecological scenar-
os. Depression has been conceptualized as a permissive strategy
hat emphasizes appeasement of dominant individuals, and low
isk-taking (Allen and Badcock, 2006). Anxiety is thought to rep-
esent a careful, cautious strategy where fears and aversive drives
re emphasized over appetitive drives (Marks and Nesse, 1994).
TSD has been conceptualized as a threat-avoidant strategy where
he individual is particularly sensitive to stimuli that it found
raumatic in the past (Panksepp, 2006). Schizophrenia has been
onceptualized as a response to severe stress that is character-
zed by disinhibition, hypervigilance, and high emotional reactivity
Reser, 2007). These and other psychological disorders may  repre-
ent compartmentalized suites of psychophysiological symptoms
hat become adaptive, when they present together, in particular
nvironmental contexts. Many “behavioral syndromes” have been
iscovered in mammalian species and these are thought to repre-
ent adaptive responses to particular scenarios, despite the fact that
hey appear maladaptive when taken out of their ecological context
Sih et al., 2004). There is an emerging consensus now in ethology
hat when traits are correlated, they should be studied together as
n ecological package rather than as isolated units (Sih et al., 2004).
The three major traits of the stress cascade, cortisol dys-
egulation, reduced hippocampal volume, and impairment in
ippocampus-dependent memory, are also major components of
epression, anxiety disorders, PTSD and schizophrenia (Lambert
nd Kinsley, 2004). Moreover, each of these four disorders are
inked with prolonged stress, traumatic past experience, exagger-
ted stress response, PFC dysregulation, attentional deﬁcits, startle
otentiation and increased heart rate responsivity (Corcoran et al.,
001; Axelson et al., 1993). Disorders like schizophrenia, PTSD,
nxiety and depression could perhaps each represent behavioral
yndromes that employ the defensive beneﬁts of the stress cascade
s identiﬁed in this article. See Table 2 below.
Evolutionary perspectives regard diseases as adaptations that
re no longer beneﬁcial because of a “mismatch” between the
ncestral environment and the modern environment (Williams
nd Nesse, 1998; Neel, 1999). In modern times, the cognitive
epercussions of excessive stress impair our ability to function pro-
essionally and decrease quality of life in the workplace and at
ome, despite the fact that our stressors are rarely life-threatening
r even physical. Because of this mismatch, the stress cascade (and•  Enrichment, stimulation, and maternal care have opposite effects on the
hippocampus and PFC
associated disorders) appears to be out of place in time; yet another
example of an “ecological anachronism.”
7. Conclusions
After an exploratory review of relevant literature this article
concludes that the 3 hypotheses presented in the introduction can-
not be accepted or rejected, but have been met with supporting
evidence (Table 3). In addition to the beneﬁts of disinhibiting the
stress response and defensive and evasive responses, the stress cas-
cade may  also allow the animal to disinhibit appetitive drives and
help it to be opportunistically nearsighted. Perhaps during stressful
times PFC functions such as the temporal organization of behav-
ior, inhibition of spontaneous activity, long-term goal setting, and
ﬂexibility with regard to novelty, all take a back seat to the more
primal cognitions involving brainstem impulses, hypothalamic
inclinations, limbic drives and striatal urges. Delaying gratiﬁcation,
thinking twice, and creating elaborate mental models of one’s envi-
ronment may  be unattractive modes of operation during stressful
times when it may  be better to employ Occam’s razor and simplify,
streamline, and expediate. The PFC and hippocampus strong-arm
behavioral control of the animal from its hard-wired instincts to
the beliefs and associations that the animal contrived based on its
unique and eccentric interaction with the world. These may  give
the animal means to subdue, pervert, and incapacitate the prime
directives of nature.Dawkins (1976) has argued that the cortex has not been allowed
tyrannical autonomy over behavior in any species because such
animals would develop motivations that are inconsistent or con-
ﬂicting with the motives of its genes. Dawkins points out that the
J.E. Reser / Behavioural Process
Table  4
Hypothesized beneﬁts of hippocampal and PFC neurodegeneration during stress.
• Reduced inhibitory pressure on the amygdala and PVN
•  Increased reaction time and disinhibition of lower motor centers
•  Increased innate, instinctual, and species speciﬁc behaviors
•  Increased defensiveness, withdrawal, avoidance, vigilance, and opportunism
•  Increased resistance to delayed gratiﬁcation, temporal discounting and
delayed or abstract rewards
•  Stress may  signify that higher-order strategies are failing or perceiving false
patterns
•  Untested episodic memories may  be tenuous during times of stress
•  Associations between temporally distant stimuli maybe tenuous during
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Bremner, J.D., 1999. Does stress damage the brain? Biol. Psychiatry 45 (7), 797–805.times of stress
ighly evolved human mind allows us to temporarily escape the
irection of “selﬁsh” genes by allowing us to reprogram and even
verride our instinctive behavior. Today humans can choose not to
ave children or choose to commit suicide, decisions that few ani-
als are granted the authority to make. The reason that humans
ave this degree of “free will” is because their ancestral ecological
iche was highly cognitively demanding and necessitated ingenu-
ty, insight, tolerance and restraint. However, evolution only allows
nimals intellectual abilities to the extent that they will help them
o live and to pass on their genes. When we take a “gene’s eye view”
f the stress cascade phenomenon it becomes apparent that our
selﬁsh” genes are not “concerned” with our higher-order intel-
ectual abilities. Hippocampus-dependent explicit memory and
FC-dependent working memory may  thus be expendable from a
ene’s perspective when these abilities interfere with the propaga-
ion of germ cells.
Explicit memory (hippocampal-dependent) and working mem-
ry (PFC-dependent) may  have evolved under relatively favorable
ircumstances over the last 300 million years. These two forms
f memory may  have been largely pioneered in early mammals
uring the Mesozoic and then expanded in primates during the
enozoic in order to inhibit and modify lower impulses and fears
n accordance with what the animal has come, by experience, to
now or believe (Dunbar and Shultz, 2006). The large frontal lobe
n primates makes it so that subcortical structures participate in
ut do not dominate the decision-making process, though during
anic they may  (Panksepp, 1998). Primates have a voluminous and
ichly connected frontal lobe because their environments require
 tremendous capacity to learn and integrate. The slow process
f “cortical civilization” that has taken place over the last several
undred thousand years has allowed the human brain to develop
urther. Our PFC allows us to be civilized, self-disciplined, polite
nd reserved – strategies that are probably only apposite dur-
ng times of civility. When the environment cannot be controlled,
ationalized or systemized; however, implicit, procedural, caudate
nd amygdalar behavioral strategies may  be preferable to explicit,
eclarative, cortical ones. That even humans have this vulnerability
ays something very speciﬁc about the adaptive value of intelli-
ence. The hypothesized beneﬁts of this vulnerability are listed in
able 4 below.
It will be difﬁcult to determine irrefutably if what we know as
he stress cascade was in fact an adaptive process in the ances-
ral past. The hypotheses presented here are largely exploratory,
nd rely on convergent, comparative evidence. This is partly due
o the paucity of related research. Furthermore, the present arti-
le has made some unsupported assumptions about stress-ecologyes 129 (2016) 105–115 113
and the nature of advanced cognition in the wild. However, this
type of exploratory analysis is generally thought to be progressive
as it is thought that analyzing disease states from an evolution-
ary perspective may  ultimately do much to inform and inﬂuence
medical theory, clinical research and ultimately even intervention
strategies.
One way to test or falsify the present hypotheses would be to
expose animals to artiﬁcial but ecologically valid environments,
and assess their behavior. Rats reared in a stress free, enriched, and
nurtured environment could be analyzed relative to rats that have
been stressed pre and postnatally. Both groups could be introduced
into an environment that is high in predation, social defeat, or low
in resources. The ability of each group to negotiate the stress-ﬁlled
environment, avoid threats and attain reproductive success could
be quantiﬁed and compared and the speciﬁc hypotheses listed in
Table 4 could be tested. A different way to test these hypotheses
would be to look for allelic or phenotypic variants in low stress
populations. For example, the glucocorticoid receptor in mammals
found on islands without natural predators could be expected to
exhibit lower binding afﬁnity or present in the hippocampus in
lower density because of their inhibitory effects on LTP. Miner-
alocorticoid receptors, which favor LTP, in such animals might be
expected to exhibit the opposite. Furthermore, comparative molec-
ular techniques may  be able to resolve polymorphic alleles that
show evidence of a selective sweep, balanced polymorphism or
other distinctive signatures of positive selection. Detailed knowl-
edge of this type of natural variation could help inspire effective
pharmacological or gene therapy treatments for humans.
The evolutionary and comparative perspectives delineated here
could potentially provide structure for empirical investigations
in behavioral ecology or psychiatric research. Molecular phyloge-
netic analyses should be able to determine if the analogues of the
stress cascade in other mammals are actually homologous to those
in humans, and trace the evolution of the relevant genes. Better
knowledge of the shared molecular pathways and neural circuits
involved will provide a framework for therapies aimed at ame-
liorating neuropsychiatric symptoms as well as the more subtle,
everyday effects of stress on human cognition.
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